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 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW - 2007 
 BY THOMAS A. DAILY1 
 
It has been an eventful year.  There is much to tell.  Lets get started. 
 
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VOIDING MINERAL QUIET TITLE DECREE 
 
John and Darla Verkamp’s predecessors secured a quiet title decree to both surface and minerals in 1976.  The decree was 
obtained by default, upon constructive service.  The only factual basis stated for the decree was adverse possession which, as to minerals, 
was provably false.2  Sonat Exploration Company, the predecessor of XTO Energy Inc., obtained an oil and gas lease from the Verkamps3 
and integrated the interest of the prior severed mineral owner.  At XTO’s request, Floyd E. Sagley Properties, LTD, the unit operator, 
suspended royalties on the interest. 
The Verkamps sued Sagely and XTO, relying upon the 1976 decree.  XTO and Sagely moved for summary judgment that the 
1976 decree was void as to the severed mineral interest.  In support of the motion, they attached a title opinion prepared by J. H. Evans, who 
had opined that the decree was likely subject to collateral attack for lack of notice, and was based upon provably false alleged facts.  The 
circuit court granted summary judgment to Sagely and XTO. 
                                                 
1Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas 
2As we all know, you can only adversely possess against a severed mineral owner by actually producing the minerals.  That had 
not happened. 
3Purely for protection. 
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The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.4  The court said that Mr. Evans’ opinion, which was unsworn, could not support 
the summary judgment and that Sagely and XTO had offered no proof that the severed mineral owners could have been notified of the 1976 
proceedings even if reasonable diligence had been exercised. 
The Court of Appeals instructed that if Sagely and XTO sought to be protected from potential double exposure, they should have 
interpleaded the royalties from the well and added the severed mineral owners to the suit. 
 SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS ITS PRIOR RULING IN SMITH V. AJ&K CASE 
One of my favorite recent decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court is its case of AJ&K Operating Co. v. Smith.5  Remember?  
That was the case where the landowners contended that the oil companies had contaminated their land, but did not want the land cleaned up, 
because that would have messed up their lawsuit against the oil companies.  The Supreme Court reversed an injunction barring the cleanup.  
The Court held that cleanup was the preferred remedy for the landowners and was in the interest of the state and its regulatory agencies. 
                                                 
4Verkamp v. Sagely, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). 
5355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d 475 (2005). 
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Well, the landowners were persistent.  When the circuit judge, who was wrong to enjoin cleanup the first time, lifted his 
injunction so that cleanup could occur, the landowners appealed that order.  The Supreme Court wasted little time on this one, making 
clear that it meant what it had already said.6  
 ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS JURISDICTION OF A.O.G.C. 
 OVER CERTAIN JOA DISPUTES 
 
Great Lakes Chemical Corporation operates three brine units in Union County.  
Albemarle Corporation has similar brine operations in Columbia County but has, at least 
for the present, avoided forming units.  Both companies process the brine to extract 
elemental bromine, some of which they sell, but most of which they incorporate into other 
chemical products. 
Great Lakes formed its units in 1995 and 1996 under the provisions of the 
Arkansas Brine Conservation Act7 when it was being sued by unleased mineral owners 
of lands near its facilities, who claimed mineral trespass resultant from the water flood 
nature of the brine production operations. 
The unitization statute requires the applicant to present a plan of operations with 
estimates of costs and revenues from brine production.  At the time its unitization 
applications were presented, Great Lakes had a rather primitive cost accounting system.  
It tracked costs from major expense categories, but allocated those costs based only 
upon estimated percentages.  When it came time to allocate estimated costs between 
the brine units and those Great Lakes facilities, such as pipelines and processing plants, 
which were not part of the units, a lot of percentage allocation took place.  Some of that 
                                                 
6Smith v. AJ& K Operating Company, ____ Ark. ____, ____ S.W.2d ____ (2006). 
7A.C.A. §15-76-301 et. seq. 
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was pretty wrong. 
Albemarle obtained a major brine lease within Great Lakes West Plant Unit from 
Murphy Oil Corporation, as well as a number of other leases from smaller companies.  
Murphy had previously elected to participate under the A.O.G.C.’s unitization order, so 
the interest was subject to the unit operating agreement approved by the A.O.G.C.  At 
first, Albemarle resold its proportionate share of brine to Great Lakes but, ultimately, it 
built a bromine plant and began taking brine in kind. 
Meanwhile, Great Lakes updated its cost accounting system, world wide, installing 
industry standard SAP accounting.  Neither Albemarle nor the A.O.G.C. were asked, or 
even told, about the change. The result of SAP was better, more accurate, cost 
accounting, but it resulted in higher joint interest bills to Albemarle and other unit 
participants. 
Albemarle filed an application before the A.O.G.C. seeking an order directing 
Great Lakes to revert to its prior accounting methodology.  Ultimately the A.O.G.C. 
granted Albemarle’s application, overruling Great Lakes’ challenges to its exercise of 
jurisdiction over a COPAS dispute.  Both the circuit court of Union County and the 
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the A.O.G.C.8 
                                                 
8Great Lakes v. Bruner, ___ Ark. ____, ____ S.W.3d ____ (2006). 
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The significance of this decision to the oil and gas industry is, as yet, 
undetermined.  It may be great.  Virtually every gas well is drilled after the operator 
secures an integration order.  That order routinely incorporates an operating agreement.  
Indeed, the A.O.G.C. has taken the seminal step of dictating a standard form operating 
agreement.  Under the logic of the Great Lakes decision, any participant who elects to 
participate under the A.O.G.C.’s integration order may request the A.O.G.C. to then 
interpret and enforce the operating agreement, rather than litigating a JOA dispute in 
court. 
The A.O.G.C. is not a court.  At any given time one, maybe two of its members will 
have attended law school.  Contract interpretation is traditionally a matter of law, decided 
by the court as such and not submitted to a jury.  Such decisions are then reviewed by an 
appellate court de novo.  However, the administrative process is different.  The agency 
is virtually presumed right.  Distinctions between law and fact are blurred.  Watch out 
folks.  This is one slippery slope.  
CONFUSING SEISMIC TRESPASS CASE HEADED FOR ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT 
You have heard the term “runaway jury”, right?  Well then, how do you feel about 
a runaway judge.  We are not talking about a jurist who failed to show up for court, either.  
El Paso Exploration Company v. Blanchard9 is an example of a runaway judge who 
stayed in the courtroom.  As they say, however, “bad facts make bad law,” and this case 
has enough bad facts to repeal the ten commandments. 
It all started when the A.O.G.C. enacted something called General Rule B-42, 
                                                 
9Columbia County, Arkansas Circuit Court Case No. E-98-212-5, consolidated with No. CIV-98-137-5, currently docketed on 
appeal as Case No. CA-06-1107. 
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regulating seismic exploration.  That rule, as originally enacted,10 provided: 
No entry shall be made by the permitee upon the lands upon which such 
seismic operations are to be conducted without the permitee having first 
secured a permit from the landowner authorizing such operation to be 
conducted.  (emphasis added) 
                                                 
10The rule has since been amended to remove the problem which started the judge running in Blanchard. 
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 James Blanchard is clearly a “landowner.”  He owns the surface and a one-half 
mineral interest under the tract involved in the litigation.  Blanchard gave an oil and gas 
lease to a company named Swift Energy Company.  That lease authorized, among other 
things, exclusive geophysical operations.  The lease also prohibited assignment without 
Blanchard’s consent.11 
The other one-half mineral interest was leased to El Paso’s predecessor, Sonat.  
That lease also authorized geophysical operations.  Swift and Sonat entered into an 
agreement whereby each became obligated to permit certain seismic operations 
conducted by the other and acquired the right to purchase a license to the data.  
Apparently pursuant to this agreement,12 Swift permitted Sonat to conduct seismic 
operations on its lease from Blanchard. 
As luck would have it, Blanchard is an extremely disgruntled Sonat ex-employee.  
He apparently even claims to still have festering knife wounds resultant from an 
altercation with another Sonat employee.  Under no circumstances would Blanchard 
permit Sonat to conduct seismic operations upon his land.  When Sonat’s contractor 
approached him for a permit, Blanchard refused. 
Sonat applied for and received a temporary restraining order allowing access to 
Blanchard’s land.  The seismic was conducted with very little surface damage, but, 
unfortunately, no promising discoveries of potential hydrocarbons. 
                                                 
11Which could not be unreasonably withheld. 
12There are some inferences in the briefs that Swift actually permitted Sonat to conduct operations beyond those covered in the 
agreement. 
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Meanwhile, Blanchard made a discovery of his own, A.O.G.C. General Rule B-42, 
and counterclaimed, alleging trespass, surface damages under the express provisions of 
the Swift lease and interference with contract13 by Sonat. 
After years of motions, every one of which Sonat lost, Sonat14 lost again in a 
bench trial.  The circuit judge held that Sonat, by not obtaining Blanchard’s express 
permission, had violated General Rule B-42, and was thus a trespasser.  He further held 
that Swift’s purported attempt to permit Sonat’s operation was precluded by the 
prohibition against assignment in the Swift lease.  Finally, he agreed with Blanchard that 
Sonat had interfered with Blanchard’s contract with Swift.  It was then that things really 
went bad for Sonat. 
In addition to surface damages, apparently awarded twice,15 the circuit judge 
awarded Blanchard $260,000 on a strange theory of unjust enrichment.  The calculation 
is interesting, to say the least.  The circuit judge took the average AFE dry hole cost of 
several wells in the vicinity and subtracted the cost of the seismic line shot by Sonat.  He 
concluded that Sonat saved $260,000 by condemning the acreage with the seismic lline, 
rather than by drilling a dry hole.  Then, through unexplained reasoning, he awarded that 
savings to Blanchard as a windfall.  Mercifully, the circuit judge denied Blanchard’s 
request for punitive damages. 
                                                 
13The Swift lease. 
14By then, El Paso. 
15Once for breach of contract and then again for interference with the same contract.  Go figure. 
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Sonat has appealed.  This case should go straight to the Supreme Court.  The 
resultant opinion may very well teach us the answers to a few Arkansas unknowns, such 
as whether a severed mineral owner may permit seismic operations against the wishes of 
the surface owner.  It certainly ought to be reversed, at least as to the 
dry-hole-minus-seismic damage award.  However, I remember saying that about 
SEECO v. Hales,16 so let us wait and see. 
 OKLAHOMA COURT AFFIRMS MALICIOUS PROSECUTION JUDGMENT 
 AGAINST PRODUCER WHICH OBTAINED T.R.O. ON FALSE STATEMENTS 
The above discussion of Blanchard should cause us to wonder whether we need 
to keep getting those handy temporary restraining orders.  Sure, T.R.O.’s are quick and 
easy.  Post a little bond, get back to work.  No notice, no nasty trial, just file the 
complaint, visit in the judge’s office, and send the sheriff out with a court order. 
That is apparently what Tidewater Petroleum Corporation had in mind when Philip 
and Joe Bill Lierly refused to allow Tidewater to use a road which they were constructing 
on their property for access to its wells, in lieu of the awkward existing lease road.  In its 
complaint Tidewater gilded its lily a bit.  It alleged, falsely, that the Lierlys had denied it 
access to its wells.17  When the dust had settled Tidewater was denied its requested 
injunction, was sued for malicious prosecution, and was on its way to the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court with a loser of an appeal.18  
 ILLINOIS COURT OF APPEALS BUCKS TREND -  
                                                 
16330 Ark. 402, 954 S.W.2d 234 (1997). 
17Not true, there was another road in use at the time which remained available. 
18Tidewater Petroleum Corporation v. Lierly, 139 P.3d 897 (Okla 2006). 
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 HOLDS THAT COAL BED METHANE BELONGS TO COAL OWNER 
 
There is no Arkansas decision whether, when gas and coal are separately owned, 
coal bed methane belongs to the gas or the coal owner.  There is a split of authority 
nationally, with most of the recent decisions going to the gas owner.  However, there are 
still jurisdictions, particularly eastern coal mining states, which go the other way.  So 
went the Illinois Court of Appeals, Fifth District in the case of Continental Resources of 
Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Methane, LLC.19 
Coal bed methane is being developed today in Western Arkansas.  Indeed, there 
is a currently pending interpleader action involving this very issue.  The last such 
interpleader case was settled, but this one involves a different coal owner.  If this issue 
ever gets to the Arkansas Supreme Court, I will bet on the gas owner, but it is not a sure 
thing. 
 TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS INTERPRETS ROYALTY RESERVATION CORRECTLY 
In Stewman Ranch, Inc. V. Double M. Ranch, Inc.,20  the Texas Court of Appeals 
interpreted the following language in a warranty deed from Stewman to Double M. Ranch: 
There is, however, excepted and reserved to the Grantors an undivided 
one-half (1/2) of the royalties to be paid on the production of oil, gas, and 
other hydrocarbons from the described lands which are presently owned by 
Grantors for and during the lives of Helen A. Stewman and O. T. Stewman, 
Jr. and, upon the death of the survivor of them, this retained royalty interest 
will vest in Grantee, its successors and assigns. 
 
                                                 
19364 Ill. App. 3d 691, 301 Ill Dec. 887, 847 N.E. 2d 897 (2006). 
20192 S.W. 3d 808 (Tex. App. Dist 11 2006). 
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The deed also excepted prior mineral reservations, thus obviating any Duhig 
issue.  The Stewmans contended that the phrase “which are presently owned” modified 
“lands,” thus giving them a net reservation of one-half, regardless of the extent of prior 
reservations.  Double M. Ranch contended, successfully, that “which are presently 
owned” modified “royalties to be paid” and that the Stewmans thus reserved only one-half 
of whatever interest they had immediately prior to the conveyance.  The Appeals court 
agreed with that interpretation. 
Had I examined this title I would have gone with the Double M. Ranch 
interpretation, so I am pleased with the decision. 
 TEXAS SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT JOA PARTY ASSIGNING 
 INTEREST REMAINS LIABLE FOR JIB EXPENSES 
 
The oil and gas industry sometimes pays little attention to its contracts, instead, 
pretending that custom can override over express contract terms.  We have seen an 
example of this when courts remind us that Maintanance of Uniform Interest is an express 
JOA provision, not subject to amendment by industry custom.  Another example comes 
to us in the form of Seagull Energy E&P v. Eland Energy Inc.21  Eland, a party to the unit 
JOA, assigned all of its unit interest to Nor-Tex Gas Corporation.  Nor-Tex failed to pay 
joint interest bills from Seagull, the unit operator.  Seagull sued Eland, which contended 
that its assignment relieved it of future liability. 
The Texas Supreme Court did not agree.  There is no express provision of the 
JOA which would convert a unilateral assignment of a party’s JOA interest into a novation.  
The common law of contract is that an assignor remains liable for the performance by its 
                                                 
21____ S.W.3d ____ (Tex. 2006) 
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assignee.  Next time, Eland, assign to someone who pays its bills. 
The legal analysis seems correct, though I suspect most of us would have guessed 
the opposite result, based upon our understanding of industry custom. 
 WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS “AT THE WELL” 
 LANGUAGE AMBIGUOUS, DISALLOWS CHARGING ROYALTY  
 OWNERS FOR ANY POST-PRODUCTION COSTS 
 
Whether, and to what extent, post-production costs are proportionately 
changeable to royalty owners remains a chaotically uncertain issue. Modern gas 
marketing methods almost never involve sales at the well.  However, most leases 
measure the royalty calculation at that place.  Thus, producers, and some courts have 
created calculated prices “at the well” for royalty calculation purposes, by netting back 
costs of gathering, transportation, dehydration, compression, etc. necessary to transport 
the gas to market and make it saleable.  Courts appear increasingly less tolerant of that 
practice, despite that it makes perfect sense. 
In Goff v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC22 the West Virginia Court of Appeals 
refused to buy the “at the well” argument.  That court acknowledged the split of authority 
nationally, but found “at the well” to be ambiguous and not a justification for netting back 
post-production costs.  Apparently, in West Virginia, the royalty owner will get his fraction 
of the gross sale price of the gas, regardless of where and how sold. 
 KANSAS COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS HABENDUM CLAUSE TRUMPS PUGH CLAUSE 
In Schwatken v. Explorer Resources, Inc., et. all23  the Kansas court of appeals 
                                                 
22219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006). 
2324 Kan. App. 2d 873, 125 P.3d 1078 (2006). 
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was required to interpret an oil and gas lease containing an apparent internal conflict.  
The lease contained a pretty typical Habendum Clause containing the language: 
If, at the expiration of the primary term of this lease, oil or gas is not being 
produced on the leased premises or on acreage pooled therewith, but 
Lessee is then engaged in drilling, reworking, or dewatering operations 
thereon, then this lease shall continue in force so long as dewatering or 
drilling operations are being continuously prosecuted...  
 
There was also a Pugh Clause which provided: 
It is agreed that at the end of the primary term, this lease shall expire as to 
all lands located outside of a producing unit. 
 
As luck would have it, the first well on the lease was commenced prior to the 
expiration of the primary term, but was not completed and put into production until after 
the primary term had expired.       
The Schwatkens argued that the Pugh Clause, which they drafted, prevailed.  
Thus, they reasoned, they got a free well.  The court held otherwise.  Under the specific 
language of the Habendum Clause, actively conducting operations is a complete 
substitute for production, not only for purposes of that clause, but for the remainder of the 
lease, as well, including the Pugh Clause.  This was a good decision.  The result urged 
by the Schwatkens would have rendered a significant portion of the Habendum Clause of 
the lease meaningless and give them an unconscionable windfall. 
 A.O.G.C. REVISES RULES AND POLICIES 
It was an active year for the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission.  With the 
continuation of intense development of the Fayetteville Shale play, two day integration 
dockets have returned.  Those two day dockets would be three or four day dockets had 
the Commission not enacted rules and procedures to streamline the process.  As an 
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example, new General Rule B-43 obviates separate field rules for units east of Pope 
County.  The Commission’s new standardized operating agreement should save time 
and energy, as well, by ending arguments over individual JOA provisions24 
Another major time saver is the Commission’s amended General Rule B-40 which 
provides authorization for the Director of Production and Conservation to administratively 
approve applications for exceptional well locations (wells located closer to unit 
boundaries than otherwise permitted) and to impose a penalty upon the well’s production 
allowable. 
The revisions to General Rule B-40 permit administrative approval, not 
withstanding the extent of the penalty,25 and have untied the administrative location 
process from the hearing docket, thus shortening the time required to obtain approval.  
Take note that there is an official application form published on the A.O.G.C.’s website.  
The A.O.G.C. staff takes the position that the use of this form is mandatory. 
 OH NO!  IT IS ANOTHER LEGISLATIVE YEAR 
Every other year, whether we need it or not,26 our legislators wander out of the 
hills and bayous to descend upon capital city.  Usually that makes for an odd year 
indeed.  
                                                 
24We will not discuss General Rule B-43 or the standardized operating agreement in detail here.  Each is the subject of a separate 
paper presented at this Institute. 
25Previously, if the calculated penalty exceeded 50%, the application required a hearing before the full commission. 
26I firmly side with the nots on this one. 
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Watch out for bills attempting to limit surface access.  There is a militant group of 
well haters down in South Logan County who can shout with the best of them.  These 
folks, many of whom purchased their lands knowing full well that they owned no minerals, 
see no good reason for oil and gas exploration.  They have the ear of a few legislators 
who are showing some determination.  The problem is that a lot more legislators do not 
care, one way or the other.  The way deals get made in the capital, we could be in 
trouble. 
Also expect legislative attempts to divest severed mineral owners of their property.  
Surface owners who own less than 100% of the minerals under their surface are 
powerfully jealous of their neighbors who get paid big bonuses.  Indeed, this may be the 
year that some kind of mineral prescription bill actually becomes law.27 
As the session has just begun, it is too soon to predict the full extent of the mischief 
to be expected.  We will know more soon and I will report then.  Stay tuned. 
                                                 
27Some of us have actually helped draft a severed mineral abandonment bill designed to be workable and constitutional. 
